A medical decision support system (DSS) is a computer program that provides reminders, advice or interpretation speci®c to a given patient at a particular time 1 . These systems differ from bibliographic or other search tools in their use of patient data to drive a`reasoner' program that searches a knowledge base to assemble a tailored report. The differences are summarized in Table 1 .
KINDS OF MEDICAL DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM
Some DSSs are designed for use by the publicÐfor example, a web-based cardiac risk calculator ([www. allhealth.com/sponsors/zocor/calculator.html]). Those for health professionals include an anticoagulant dosage calculator 2 , an AIDS reminder system 3 , and the tools used by NHS Direct nurses to triage 12 million cases per annum 4 .
DSSs can also be embedded in medical instruments such as electrocardiographs 5 or lung function recorders 6 . Others are integrated into general-practice or hospital information systems, and these can issue not only routine reminders but also urgent alerts about test orders, laboratory results or possible drug interactions 3 . In one study such a system led to more rational test ordering and reduced inpatient length of stay by a dayÐthough at the cost of requiring junior doctors to spend 6 minutes extra per patient per day ordering tests 7 .
DO WE NEED DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS?
A ®rst question is, do doctors want decision support? A survey of 403 Internet-literate UK doctors (41% general practitioners), all members of the Medix Internet service provider, showed that in one month 60% would use a Royal College guideline, 55% a¯owchart and 39% a checklist but only 24% would use a computer-based decision support system; 33% would never use one. Are these doctors right to judge DSSs less acceptable than guidelines,¯owcharts or checklists? One drawback of guidelines and¯owcharts is their proliferation 8 , while another is dif®culty tracing the path of a patient at a given encounter, even if you have the right guideline. Van Wijk used a randomized trial to compare the ability of a computer-based standard 15-item checklist and a DSS-generated problem-speci®c list derived from national guidelines to reduce the number of tests ordered by 66 Dutch general practitioners 9 . For those GPs randomized to the standard list there was a 12% reduction in the number of tests per order form, but the reduction was 29% (2.4 times greater) with the problem-speci®c DSS. Overall, the DSS led to 20% fewer tests ordered per GP than the standard checklist. Thus, despite the reluctance of computer-literate doctors to use DSSs, these systems can be more effective than their preferred tools such as a paper or computer based checklist. An alternative analysis requires understanding of how DSSs might overcome barriers to clinical innovation (article 3). The PRECEDE model 10 suggests that, to innovate, we must ®rst predispose doctors to change by informing them of the innovation, then enable them to change by providing the necessary resources, and ®nally reinforce the change. A wide range of techniques including DSSs are available to assist this process, but should only be applied after consideration of the personal and organizational barriers to change. Some barriers that can occur at each of the three innovation stages are listed in Table 2 , with suggestions about how decision support systems might help overcome most of them: clearly, DSSs have the potential to assist at all three innovation stages, particularly when they are used to educate patients and clinicians, to support staff substitution or to enhance data capture and interpretation.
This leads on to the question, when do DSSs actually change doctors' decisions, actions and patient outcomes?
When do decision support systems work?
Friedman et al. 11 examined the in¯uence of two commercial diagnostic DSSs on the decisions of 216 US doctors confronted with dif®cult case scenarios 11 . Overall, the correct diagnosis appeared on 40% of doctors' differential diagnosis lists pre-DSS and 45% post-DSSÐan 11% increase in diagnostic accuracy. In 12% of cases, the DSS caused doctors to put the correct diagnosis on their list but in 6% it caused them to drop the correct diagnosis, giving a net gain of 6%. The net gain was largest for students (9%) and smallest for faculty (3%). The QMR system 12 produced a net gain of 8%, twice that of the ILIAD system (4.1%). Thus a DSS, if it is to improve performance substantially, needs to be well designed and to be used by relatively inexperienced doctors. On some occasions a DSS causes doctors to override their own correct decisions.
How often DSSs improve clinical decisions is less important than how often they lead to more appropriate . Formal continuing education course: 1/7 (14%) . Educational materials: 4/11 (36%) . Audit and feedback: 10/24 (42%) . Patient mediated (e.g. lea¯ets): 7/9 (78%) . Reminders to clinicians (e.g. DSS): 22/26 (85%) . Outreach visits: 7/7 (100%) . Opinion leaders: 3/3 (100%) This showed that simple reminder systems were more effective at improving clinical actions than continuing medical education, audit and feedback, mailed educational materials or patient-mediated interventions, but less effective than the typical methods used by the pharmaceutical industry. One concern about these results is that they came from a wide range of settings, so perhaps the DSSs were used on clinical practices that were easier to alter. The only rigorous way to determine whether DSSs are more effective than another innovation method is to conduct a comparison within a single study. However, there are very few within-study comparisons. I have already mentioned one showing that DSSs were more effective than a standard checklist for containing test orders 9 . In another trial, a DSS was compared with a DSS combined with a team intervention, for improvement of drug ordering 16 . The expensive team intervention brought no additional bene®t.
One factor that will obviously in¯uence the acceptability of a DSS, and also its effectiveness, is the source of its knowledge 17 .
SOURCE OF KNOWLEDGE FOR A DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM
All too often in the past the knowledge for DSSs has been acquired by a computer scientist or a knowledge engineer from a single expertÐor even by browsing outof-date narrative textbooks, with all their defects 18 . A handful of systems such as QMR 12 were constructed after informal literature reviews, while Preop was the ®rst in which the knowledge engineering team used a critical appraisal process and tagged each fact in the knowledge base with its level of evidence 19 . A more recent example of a DSS based on reliable evidence is an ischaemic heart disease risk adviser used daily at a London teaching hospital 20 . The knowledge on which all advice is based derives from regression equations ®tting the Framingham dataset.
With the growth of secondary literature such as Cochrane reviews and Clinical Evidence, it is now much easier for those building DSSs to assemble the knowledge base direct from relevant evidence. However, whether you are building a DSS or writing a practice guideline, the goal is to give advice rather than simply pre Âcis evidence. As well as the relevant evidence, therefore, makers of DSSs need to include information on such matters as preferences, policies and resource availability. If an evidence-based guideline already exists which has assimilated all this information, this makes the perfect starting-point for a DSS knowledge base (Figure 1 
CONCLUSIONS
DSSs are a seductive technology with the potential to lessen information overload and reduce clinical oversights. However, we should remember that there will often be more than one way to resolve a problemÐmedication errors, for example 21 . Although DSSs can help at each of the three main innovation stages, it would be wrong to conclude that they are always the correct solution 22 . One reason to think twice before developing or buying a DSS is that these systems do have important drawbacks. As with many information systems 23 , there is a risk that an expensive, in¯exible DSS will freeze an organization's policies and procedures at one historical moment. DSSs can also be unpredictable 24 , needing rigorous evaluation 1, 25 to ensure that they are indeed improving clinical practice. Few DSSs will be used unless most of the patient information can be drawn from other routine data sources in suitably coded form. This means that they require substantial infrastructure, in the form of networks, electronic patient records and ubiquitous terminals (which need to be used frequently if medical staff are to receive alerts and reminders promptly). For example, in the Safran study of outpatient reminders 3 , the median time till doctors responded to a computer-generated alert was 11 days: the reason for this delay was they did not use the computer regularly. Box 1 lists some criteria for a clinically useful DSS.
DSSs also raise complex professional and medicolegal issues. For example, to avoid exposure to liability, every DSS must treat its user as a`learned intermediary' 30 . Consequently, black-box reasoners such as neural networks are clinically dubious 31 . Lately, a GP was sued after prescribing antacids for an epilepsy patient; the antacids had precipitated a seizure, causing the patient's driving licence to be withdrawn. The GP had inferred that, because there had been no alert from his prescribing system, no hazard would arise. However, although the system`knew' that antacids are contraindicated in epilepsy and that the patient was receiving phenytoin, it did not`know' that phenytoin is an antiepileptic drug. It was thus unable to deduce that the patient had epilepsy and that antacids were contraindicated.
Currently, although DSSs work well in certain clinical niches, their overall cost-effectiveness compared with other innovation methods is unclear. It also remains to be seen whether the complex systems developed with advanced arti®cial intelligence' functions have greater impact, or are easier to maintain, than the simple reminder and algorithm systems already widely used in electronic patient records and for nurse triage. The knowledge is based on the best evidence available (e.g. an evidence-based practice guideline or risk score)
The knowledge covers the problem in suf®cient breadth and depth to allow sophisticated problem solving, advice and explanations
To ensure¯exibility, the knowledge can be readily updated by a clinician without unexpected effects
To promote lifelong learning, the knowledge base links to related local and Internet material (images, practice guidelines...) To make the system easy to use, most patient data are drawn from existing electronic sources
The performance of the entire system is validated against a suitable gold standard (Ref. 27)
The system improves clinical practice or patient outcomes in a rigorous study (Refs 1, 25) The clinician is always in control, so can receive advice, browse the knowledge base, get help and explanations, try out`what-if' scenarios and obtain a critique of the patient management plan
The system is easy to accessÐfor example via the world wide web [e.g. the Heart Failure Program (Ref. 28) or an infective endocarditis advisor for developing countries (Ref. 29 )]
